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PATENT LAW - CONDITIONS IN LEASES MADE BY PATENTEE TO HIS
LICENSEES - SUITS FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT - Respondent manufactured and leased patented devices used in the canning industry for depositing salt
tablets. One condition in the leases for these -machines required licensees to use
with the patented m~chines only tablets sold by respondent's subsidiary. Respondent sued in the district court for an injunction and an accounting for infringement of its patent by petitioner, who manufactured and leased infringing
salt-depositing machines. Upon petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground
that respondent was making use of its patent to restrain the sale of salt tablets in
competition with its own sale of unpatented tablets, the trial court grant~d a
summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari b_ecause of the public interest involved and the alleged conflict of the
decision below with prior decisions. Held, that since respondent, by using its
patent to restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, was
creating a monopoly beyond the scope of the patent in violation of public policy,
it was not entitled to any relief against the petitioner, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402 (1942).
The grant to the inventor of a special privilege of a patent monopoly carries
out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States,
"to promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive rights to their . . . Discoveries." 1 This
grant gives the patentee an incorporeal property right to exclude others from its
use, 2 but imposes no public duty on him to use his invention or to make it available for use by others. 3 The patentee may waive this right to exclude by selling

U. S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. (55 U. S.) 539 (1852); Patterson v, Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878); United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S.
224, l 7 S. Ct. 809 ( l 896). See Barnett, "Within his Domain the Patentee is Czar,"
17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 92 (1935).
3 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 S. Ct.
748 ( 1909); reaffirmed recently in Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents
Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 483 (1931). For a discussion of the
1

2

1942}
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his invention ¼ or by granting licenses for its use. 5 In order fully to protect his
exclusive rights under the patent, the courts have allowed the patentee to put
certain conditions and restrictions in these licenses. In determining the validity
of such conditions, the courts generally have applied the following vague and
tenuous test: Are the conditions imposed reasonably adapted to secure to the
patentee full enjoyment of his exclusive rights in the field within which he has
a monopoly by virtue of his patent? 6 Regardless of how this test is phrased, a
survey of the cases discloses that conditions are declared valid if they secure direct
pecuniary benefit to the patentee under his patent, or pertain to the marketability of the patented article itself. 7 However, inventions not covered' by the
patent are not included within the public policy underlying the grant of the
exclusive monopoly. 8 Therefore, conditions. in a patent license regarding unpatented articles have been invalidated by the courts. 9 The license in the principal case obviously includes such an illegal condition, but the decision is significant in that the Court refuses the patentee an injunction against a direct infringer because of an illegal condition which is not otherwise material to the case.
As authority, the Court cites cases involving contributory infringement where the
defendant has sold competing unpatented articles to the licensee of the plaintiff
scope of the patent monopoly, see Folk, "Scope and Limitations of the Patent Monopoly," 2 NAT. AssN. MFRS. LAW Die. 149 (1939), and 52 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1938).
4 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, II S. Ct. 334 (1890).
5 De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. CQ. v. United States, 273 U. S. 236, 47 S. Ct.
366 (1926). The license is not an exercise of any power granted by the patent, but is
merely an exercise by the patentee of his natural right to relinquish part of his right
of exclusive possession.
6 Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136 (use
of patented wringer and gear mechanism restricted to certain types of washing mac1:iines
held a valid condition); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305
U.S. 124, 59 S. Ct. II6 (1939) (condition narrowly limiting scope of field of manufacture and sale held valid); United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., (D. C. N. Y.
1939) 27 F. Supp. 959 (limitation of methods of sale to be used by licensee and price
fixing by patentee held valid). See also Brown, "Relation of Ethyl Gasoline AntiTrust Case to Restrictions in Patent Licenses," 7 UNIV. P1TT. L. REV. 26 (1940);
31 CoL. L. Riv. 743 (1931); and 48 C. J. 267 (1929) .
. 7 Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 S. Ct. 747 (1902) (sales
price); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., (C. C. A. 7th,
1907) 154 F. 358 (quantity); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163,
51 S. Ct. 421 (1931) (royalties); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 788
(1869) (territorial restrictions); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric
Co., 305 U.S. 124, 58 S. Ct. II6 (1939) (field of use restricted).
8 2 WALKER, PATENTS, Deller's ed., § 404, p. 1567 (1937).
9 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37
S. Ct. 416 (1917). This decision overruled the decision of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.,
224 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 424 (1912), which had started a precedent contra to the
principal case. Justice Holmes' dissent in the Motion Picture case, to the effect that a
patentee may forbid the use of a patented article completely, and therefore a condition
pertaining to an unpatented article is a lesser restriction and should be declared valid,
did not gain support in later cases.
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patentee in violation of a condition of the license. 10 In such cases, the illegal condition is directly in issue because the sale of the unpatented product to the licensee
would not be a contributory infringement, if it were not for the illegal condition.11 The decision is a recognition of the recent extension of the "clean hands"
doctrine of equity. 12 Under such an application of the doctrine, the misconduct
does not have to be actually connected with the matter in litigation in order to
warrant the equity court in refusing the offending party the relief he seeks. The
equity courts are most cautious about allowing the patentee to subvert the general
public policy underlying the grant of his patent by improper use of it.13 Although
the courts do not require the patentee to lead a "blameless life," 14 they refuse
him relief when he uses his patent for such an illegal purpose as the maintenance
of an attempted monopoly of an unpatented article. The most recent cases state
that if the patentee will aband_on the improper practice and prove that its consequences have been dissipated, he may then seek equitable relief against the
direct infringer.15 This doctrine seems to allow the equity court to retain
continuing control over the patentee's business; for it would appear that if the
patentee were to resume the illegal practice in the future, the defendant here
10 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37
S. Ct. 416 (1917); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 5 I S. Ct. 483 ( 193 I); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458,
58 S. Ct. 288 (1938); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) II7 F.
(2d) 829.
11 In the principal case, the direct infringer also sold unpatented salt tablets to
patentee's licensees. However, for purposes of the decision, the Court treated the case
as if this fact did not exist. Consequently, the illegal condition did not directly affect
the infringer in this litigation.
12 2 PoMERoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 5th ed., § 399 (1941). An important
case in the United States on the "clean hands" doctrine of equity is Bateman v. Fargason, (C. C. Tenn. 1880) 4 F. 32, where the court held that the misconduct must be
connected with the transaction between the plaintiff and def~ndant. However, the
courts of equity gradually liberalized this rule. In Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54 S. Ct. 146 (1933), the Supreme Court denied relief
to a plaintiff suing for infringement because the defendant showed that in a previous
unrelated suit plaintiff had suppressed evidence damaging to the patents. In holding
· against the plaintiff, the Court stated that die test was whether the misconduct affected
the equity which complainant sought in respect of the matter in litigation, relying
more on general considerations of right and justice than on whether the misconduct
was closely connected with the particular matter before the court.
13 Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 2 S. Ct. 436 (1883);
Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 23 S. Ct. 161 (1902).
14 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S. Ct. 684 (1934); Key~tone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 54 S. Ct. 146 (1933).
16 B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 829, affd.
(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 406. In American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., (D. C. Ill.
1941) 42 F. Supp. 270, the patentee used his patent to create a monopoly in an
unpatented article for .about six years before giving up the illegal practice and suing
for direct infringement for die six years. The court held that he could not cleanse his
hands as to the prior period, but- that as to die period after giving up the illegal condition, he was in a position to seek equitable relief against the infringer.
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could successfully ask the equity court to dismiss any order awarded against him.
While it may seem strange that a direct infringer can defend his infringement
because of an illegal condition in a license to a third person, the decision in the
principal case introduces a potent method of enforcing public policy by discouraging the use of such illegal conditions by the patentee.16
Brooks F. Crabtree

16 There seems to be no reason why the patentee could not sue the direct infringer for damages for the infringement, for the law courts do not follow the equitable
doctrine of "clean hands." However, this relief would probably not satisfy the patentee
in such a case.

